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Abstract
In many public health care systems treatment is rationed by wait-
ing time. We examine the optimal allocation of a ￿xed supply of a
treatment between di⁄erent groups of patients. Even in the absence
of any distributional aims welfare is increased by third degree waiting
time discrimination. Because waiting time imposes dead weight losses
on patients, lower waiting times should be o⁄ered to groups with higher
marginal waiting time costs and with less elastic demand for the treat-
ment.
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Waiting times are used as a rationing mechanism for elective surgery in
many countries with tax or public health insurance ￿nance. Examples in-
clude Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain and the
United Kingdom. Average waiting times for common procedures, such as
hip and knee replacement, cataract surgery or varicose veins, of six months
are not uncommon (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005).
The question we consider is whether di⁄erent types of potential patients
(young vs old, men vs women, northerners vs southerners) waiting for the
same treatment should face di⁄erent waiting times. We do not investigate
whether types with di⁄erent demands (at a given waiting time) for the
treatment should have di⁄erent amounts allocated to them. Rather we ask
whether di⁄erent types should face di⁄erent waits, so that the marginal
patients of di⁄erent types have di⁄erent bene￿ts from the treatment. We
show that in general it is welfare increasing to set di⁄erent waiting times for
di⁄erent groups of patients waiting for the same treatment.
When treatment is rationed by waiting time there are no public sec-
tor revenue consequences of changing the allocation of a given amount of
treatment between two groups of potential patients. Choosing the alloca-
tion of a given supply of treatment between the two groups is equivalent to
determining their waiting times.
Individuals di⁄er in their health gains from treatment and the marginal
patient in a group places a value on the health gain which is equal to their
waiting time cost. Suppose that the two groups have the same preferences
but have di⁄erent distributions of health gains from treatment. With equal
waiting times for the two groups, the health gains of the marginal treated
patient in each group are equal. Switching a unit of treatment from group
A to group B will not alter production costs. Nor will it change the total
health gain from treatment since the marginal patient in each group has the
same health gain. But the switch will lead to a higher waiting time in group
A and a lower waiting time in group B.
Waiting time is a deadweight loss: it imposes costs on patients which are
not o⁄set by gains to anyone else. If group A has a more waiting time elastic
demand than group B then the total waiting time of group A patients will fall
by more than the increase in total waiting time of group B patients and total
waiting time over all patients will fall. Hence waiting time discrimination
in favour of the group with the less elastic is welfare increasing. If the two
groups have di⁄erent preferences as well as a di⁄erent distribution of health
gains then the direction of discrimination will also depend on the marginal
1cost of waiting per treated patient in the two groups. But the conclusion is
the same: in general it is welfare increasing to o⁄er di⁄erent waiting times
to di⁄erent groups of patients. Notice that the discrimination does not arise
from any wish to favour one group over another on distributional grounds
nor does it arise from a need to raise revenue as might be the case if care
was rationed by user charges.
The results provide support for the prioritisation schemes such as those in
Canada, New Zealand, Spain and Sweden (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005) which
set di⁄erent waiting times for di⁄erent types of patient waiting for the same
treatment. They also have implications for the allocation of resources across
regions and debates over post code rationing. If patients in di⁄erent regions
have di⁄erent preferences or distributions of bene￿ts from treatment then
optimal geographical resource allocation will yield di⁄erent waiting times
for the same treatment in di⁄erent regions.
In a previous paper (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2007a) we examined linear
prioritisation rules where the waiting time for patients varied linearly accord-
ing to some characteristic such as age. We showed that linear prioritisation
was welfare increasing unless the age and health bene￿t had a particular
type of joint distribution. The categorical prioritisation scheme considered
in this paper is more general in that it does not require that waiting times
are linear, or even monotonic, with respect to observable patient character-
istics. With categorical prioritisation waits could be high for the old and
young and low for the middle aged. Since categorical prioritisation is more
general, the conditions under which it is welfare increasing are weaker than
with linear prioritisation. All that is necessary is that is possible to de￿ne
categories of patients with either di⁄erent preferences or di⁄erent distrib-
utions of health gain so that they have either di⁄erent marginal costs of
waiting or di⁄erent demand elasticities.
There are two related literatures. The ￿rst examines the optimal allo-
cation of a health care budget across di⁄erent treatments (Garber, 2000,
Gravelle and Siciliani, 2007b; Hoel, 2007; Smith, 2005). In this paper we
examine allocation within a treatment to di⁄erent groups of patients. The
allocation rule used within a treatment will a⁄ect the marginal value of re-
sources devoted to a treatment and hence the optimal allocation of a budget
across treatments. The second literature examines the optimal mix of money
and time prices to ration treatment (Gravelle and Siciliani, 2007c; Hoel and
Saether 2003; Marchand and Schroyan, 2004). Our conclusion that waiting
time discrimination within treatments increases welfare from rationing by
waiting has implications for the optimal mix of money and waiting time
prices.
2Section 2 describes patient preferences and demand and sets out the
welfare function. Section 3 shows that the optimal allocation requires third
degree waiting time discrimination. Section 4 shows that the results hold
in more general speci￿cations when demand for public sector care depends
on income and patients also have the option of buying care in the private
sector where there is no wait. Section 5 concludes.
2 Rationing by waiting time
2.1 Preferences and demand
All health care is produced in a public health care system. We consider the
implications of a private sector alternative in Section 4. Demand for treat-
ment in the public sector is rationed by waiting. To reduce notational clutter
we initially assume there are no user charges and relax this assumption in
Section 4. h 2 [hmin;hmax] is the health gain or bene￿t from treatment.
There are two types or groups of individual j = A;B with di⁄erent den-
sity and distribution functions fj(h) and Fj(h). The total population is
normalised to 1. The proportion of the population in group j is ￿j and P
j ￿j = 1.
We assume that all individuals of a given type have the same preferences
but di⁄erent types may have di⁄erent preferences. Allowing for di⁄erences
in preferences within groups merely complicates the analysis and does not
alter the results. If ill and not treated an individual of type j has utility
vNT
j . Treated patients in group j have a wait of wj before receiving one
unit of treatment which produces health gain h. Utility if treated vT
j (h;wj)
is increasing in health gain and decreasing in the wait: @vT
j (h;wj)=@h =
vT
jh > 0, @vT
j (h;wj)=@wj = vT
jw < 0.1 We do not need to consider utility or
welfare for well individuals since allocating a ￿xed amount of a treatment
between groups has no e⁄ect on the utility or welfare of individuals who
are not ill. The key assumption is that increases in waiting time reduce the
utility from treatment compared with the no treatment alternative.
The most salient form of rationing by waiting time is rationing by waiting
list for elective care. Individuals bear a cost in getting on the waiting list
for treatment. In systems with gatekeeping general practitioners, patients
￿rst have to consult their general practitioner to get a referral and then
1We are assuming that health is separable from other variables a⁄ecting utility, for
example consumption of other private goods, and that these other variables are una⁄ected
by whether the individual is treated or not. We relax this assumption in Section 4.
3incur further costs in attending hospital outpatient department to be seen
by a specialist who will then place them on a waiting list. The longer the
time patients have to wait on the list, the less the discounted value of the
treatment and the less likely are they to be willing to incur the initial costs
of joining the list (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith, 1999;
Farnworth, 2003).2
In some systems there is rationing by waiting in line (queues). Waiting
for treatment has an opportunity cost of forgone work or leisure time, as
well as possible e⁄ects on the health gain. Rationing by waiting line can
be used for minor ailments in hospital accident and emergency rooms and
for general practitioner consultations. Our speci￿cation encompasses both
rationing by waiting list and by waiting line and does not restrict the way in
which longer waits reduce the utility of treatment relative to no treatment
(Hoel and Saether, 2003).
An individual of type j demands treatment if and only if
vT
j (h;wj) ￿ vNT
j ￿ 0 () h ￿ ^ hj = ^ hj(wj) (1)
where ^ hj(wj) is the threshold health gain such that all those with a smaller
gain do not seek treatment. The threshold is increasing in the waiting time
since
@^ hj=@wj = ^ hjw(wj) = ￿vT
jw(^ hj;wj)=vT
jh(^ hj;wj) > 0 (2)
Note that if the two groups have the same preferences and di⁄er only in
the distribution of health gain, all patients would have the same threshold
at a given waiting time, irrespective of their group. Conversely, if they
di⁄er in the utility from treatment or non-treatment and have the same
distributions, their thresholds will di⁄er. For example if group A has more
utility from treatment, then its threshold is lower: a member of group A
would be more likely to seek treatment. However, the marginal individuals
in both groups would have the same utility from treatment if their non-
treatment utility is the same, irrespective of their treatment utility functions
and their distribution functions.






1 ￿ Fj(^ hj)
i
(3)
2Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) assume a utility function from treatment equal to
he
￿w ￿c, where c is the ￿xed cost of getting on the list. Our speci￿cation is more general
since we do not impose a negative exponential discount rate.
4where Dj(wj) is demand per person of type j. From (2) demand is decreasing
in the waiting time
Djw(wj) = ￿^ hjw(wj)fj(^ hj(wj)) < 0 (4)
The empirical evidence shows that increases in waiting time reduce demand
for health care (Gravelle, Smith and Xavier, 2003; Martin and Smith, 1999;
Martin et al, 2007).
2.2 Determination of waiting time
The supply of treatment allocated to group j is zj and total supply is z = P
j zj: The waiting time wj(zj) for group j is determined by
￿jDj(wj) ￿ zj ￿ 0; wj ￿ 0; wj [￿jDj(wj) ￿ zj] = 0 (5)









j ￿j Dj(0) > z.
When there is no prioritisation patients in the two groups face the same
waiting time ￿ w which is determined by
P
j
￿jDj( ￿ w) = z (7)
where Dj( ￿ w) > 0. At ￿ w the di⁄erent types have the same treatment thresh-
old if and only if they have the same preferences. With a common waiting
list and equal waiting times the amount of capacity allocated to type j is ￿ zj
= ￿jDj( ￿ w). Note that although waiting time is the same, supply di⁄ers in
equilibrium for the di⁄erent types.
2.3 Welfare
The planner knows the distribution functions but cannot prioritise individual
patients on the basis of their health gain. Expected utility for potential









5If one group￿ s expected utility had a greater social value than the other it
would be unsurprising that the groups would be o⁄ered di⁄erent waiting
times. To focus on other factors determining their waiting times we assume

























jw(h;wj)dFj < 0 (10)
where the term in the square brackets on the ￿rst line is zero because individ-
uals make privately optimal decisions about demanding care and the welfare
function respects these decisions. The marginal welfare cost of waiting per





jw(h;wj)dFj=Dj > 0 (11)
3 Optimal third degree waiting time discrimina-
tion
The cost of treatment does not depend on the type of patient. Hence the
problem of allocating a given amount of treatment requires that welfare S
is maximised by choice of zj subject to
P
j zj ￿ z.
Using the constraint to substitute z ￿ zA for zB, recalling (2), (4) and
(6), the marginal welfare e⁄ect of prioritising type A by increasing zA (and






























6The signs of the ￿rst and second derivatives (see Appendix) of the welfare
function with respect to zA depend on the speci￿cs of the preferences and
distributions of the two groups. But by inspecting (12) at zA = ￿ zA where
wA = wB = ￿ w we see that
Proposition 1 O⁄ering di⁄erent waiting times to groups waiting for a
treatment (third degree waiting time discrimination) is always welfare in-
creasing unless the groups have the same preferences and the same distribu-
tion of health gains from treatment.
Although the direction of prioritisation depends on the details of pref-
erences and distributions of health gain we can provide an example where
there is a de￿nite conclusion. An alternative way to write (12) when the




































^ h( ￿ w)
vT















^ h( ￿ w)
vT
w(h; ￿ w)dFB(h) (14)












w(^ h( ￿ w); ￿ w)
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^ h( ￿ w)
vT






^ h( ￿ w)
vT
w(h; ￿ w)dFB(h) (15)
If the distribution of bene￿t of group A strictly ￿rst order stochastically
dominates that of group B, FA(h) < FB(h), h 2 (hmin;hmax), and if the
marginal disutility of waiting is higher for patients with higher bene￿t, vT
wh <
0, then the ￿rst term is positive. If the demand of group B is more responsive
than group A, i.e. ￿DBw > ￿DAw, then the second term is also positive,
and prioritising group A is always welfare improving.
7Proposition 2 If (a) the distribution of bene￿t of group A strictly ￿rst
order stochastically dominates that one of group B (FA(h) < FB(h);h 2






; (c) demand of group B is more responsive
than group A (￿DBw > ￿DAw); then welfare is higher for some degree
of prioritisation of group A (wA < ￿ w < wB) than with no prioritisation
(wA = ￿ w = wB).
Using the de￿nitions of the marginal welfare cost of waiting (11), we can










where "j = Djwwj=Dj is the elasticity of demand by group j with respect
to waiting time. Hence
Proposition 3 The optimal prioritisation scheme for patient groups A and









Thus, if the marginal cost of waiting is identical across the two groups
(￿A = ￿B), the group with the less elastic demand will be prioritised by
getting lower waiting times. If the elasticity of demand is identical across
the two groups ("Aw = "Aw), the group with the lower marginal cost of
waiting will be prioritised by getting higher waiting times.
Figure 1 provides an intuition for the welfare e⁄ects of discrimination in
a simple case where the two groups have the same size (￿A = ￿B = 1=2),
and the same preferences. The utility of treated patients is vT
j = h ￿kwj.
Thus the per patient marginal welfare cost of an increase in waiting time
(32) is the same for both groups: ￿A = ￿B = k.
Total supply is the horizontal distance between the vertical axes. Supply
to group A is measured rightwards from the left origin. All patients for
whom h ￿ kwj demand treatment and the demand curve for group j is
￿jDj(wj) = ￿j[1￿Fj(kwj)]. The waiting time for each group is determined
by the intersection of their demand curve and the vertical supply curve at
zj.
The expected health gain from treatment for group j, net of waiting
time costs, is ￿j
R
^ hj(h ￿ kwj)dFj which is the area below their demand
curve and above the waiting time price line. Since waiting time costs are
8deadweight losses, the allocation of the given total supply of treatment be-





^ hj(h ￿ kwj)dFj.
Consider moving from an initial allocation zA = ￿ zA with equal waiting
times ( ￿ w), to an allocation zo
A < ￿ zA where group A has reduced supply and
hence a higher waiting time than group B: wo
A > ￿ w > wo
B. The loss to group
A which has the more elastic demand is a+b which is less than the gain to
group B of d + e + f. Since total production cost is unchanged, welfare is
increased by the discrimination in favour of group B which has less elastic
demand at the initial no discrimination allocation.
The gross potential bene￿t from treatment for the groups, before taking
account of waiting time costs, is the area under their demand curves. Thus







with a lower waiting time. Nor should priority
necessarily be given to the group with greater bene￿ts to treated patients ￿
￿j
R
^ hj( ￿ w) hdFj
￿
. Account must also be taken of how the two groups will
respond to the changes in waiting times when prioritisation is introduced
and capacity is shifted from one to the other.
Waiting time is a deadweight cost: it rations demand by imposing costs
on users which are not o⁄set by a gain to anyone else (Barzel, 1974). Money
prices also ration by imposing costs on users but these costs are o⁄set by
the revenue received by the producer. If the payments by patients have the
same welfare weight as the resulting revenue and all patients have the same
social weight, third degree price discrimination would be welfare reducing.
The prices charged to the two groups should aim to maximise the sum of
consumer surplus and producer pro￿t. Given that the total supply is ￿xed
this is equivalent to maximising willingness to pay or the sum of the areas
under the demand curves in (money price, quantity) space. Thus, if we
temporarily interpret w as a money price, so that Figure 1 plots demand
curves for groups A and B in (money price, quantity) space, any move from
the initial allocation ￿ zA with equal prices reduces the sum of the willingness
to pay of the two groups. For example, the reallocation from ￿ zA to zo
A
gives a lower money price to group B and would reduce welfare by the area
b+c.3 Intuitively, with a ￿xed supply to allocate and with no distributional
3Consumers of group B gain d + e + f, and the producer gains from group B is
g + h + i ￿ e ￿ f. Net welfare gain from group B is g + h + i + d. Consumers of group A
loose a+b, and the producer loss from group A is c+d+g+h+i￿a. Net welfare loss from
group A is c+d+g +h+i+b. The di⁄erence between the net welfare loss from group B
and the net welfare gain from group A is (c + d + g + h + i + b)￿(g + h + i + d) = b+c.
9considerations, optimal allocation when there is rationing by money price
maximises willingness to pay and when there is rationing by waiting time,
it maximises consumer surplus. The di⁄erence arises because waiting time
imposes a deadweight loss.
Figure 1 is also useful in illustrating the possibility of corner solutions and
non-concavity of the welfare function even with plausible simple assumptions
about preferences. A small shift from equal waiting times to higher waits
for group A increases welfare. But this is only a local welfare improvement.
Recall that the utility of treated patients are vT
j = h ￿kwj. Then, the





































so that there are local optima at both extreme prioritisation allocations
where all the treatment is given to one group. There will also be an allocation
where the ￿rst order condition is satis￿ed but, if there is only one such
allocation, it is a global minimum. In the example in Figure 1 welfare is
maximised by giving all the supply to group B (setting them a wait of w￿
B)
rather than giving it all to group A with a wait of w￿
A.
We can use (18) to state another set of assumptions about preferences
which yields a de￿nite conclusion about the direction of welfare increasing
prioritisation. Distributions can be uniquely characterised by their hazard







; h 2 (hmin;hmax) (21)
If (21) holds then the distribution FA ￿rst order stochastically dominates
distribution FB (De Fraja, 2005, p.1014) which in turn implies that indi-





















At wA = wB = ￿ w the term in the second line is zero and so (22) is positive
if FA is more favourable than FB. Now evaluate (22) at wA < ￿ w < wB.
The ￿rst term is positive. The second term is non-negative if the group B
hazard rates is monotonically non-decreasing. Many common distributions
such as the uniform, logistic, chi-squared, exponential and Laplace have
non-decreasing hazard rates (La⁄ont and Tirole, 1993, p.66).
This establishes
Proposition 4 (a) If both groups have the same separable preferences with
linear waiting time costs: vT(h;wj) = h ￿ kwj and group A has a more
favourable distribution of bene￿ts in the sense of (21), then some degree
of prioritisation in favour of group A is welfare increasing compared with
prioritisation. If (b) in addition, the hazard rates for group B is monotoni-
cally non-decreasing (d[fB=(1 ￿ FB)]=dh ￿ 0) then group Ashould be given
complete priority ie it should get the entire supply of treatment.
4 Extension
We have so far made a number of simplifying assumptions: no e⁄ect of
treatment on other factors a⁄ecting utility, zero charges for public sector
care, and no alternative private sector supply of health care. We now show
that relaxing these assumptions leaves the basic result about the welfare
gain from third degree waiting time discrimination unchanged.
Suppose that utility for a member of group j when treated in the public
sector is vT
j (y ￿ p;h;wj) where y 2 [ymin;ymax] and p is the ￿xed user
charge for public sector health care. There is a private sector where health
care treatment with no wait is available at price m. Utility if treated in
the private health care sector is vT
j (y ￿ m;h;0). We assume that m > p
otherwise no patient ever demands care in the public sector. However we
do not need to assume that p ￿ 0: individuals could be paid to consume
public health care. Utility if not treated is vNT
j (y).4 All utility functions are
concave in income and vT
j is increasing in health gain and decreasing in the
4The formulation allows for the possibility that receiving treatment can increase in-
11waiting time. We also assume that treatment increases the marginal utility
of income vT
jy(y;h;w) > vNT
jy (y) and that marginal utility of income is not
increased by a positive wait: vT
jy(y;h;w) ￿ vT
jy(y;h;0).
Patients choose public treatment to no treatment if vT
j (y ￿ p;h;wj) ￿
vNT
j (y). The health gain threshold above which patients prefer public (gov-
ernment) treatment to no treatment is ^ hGN
j (y;p;wj). The threshold is in-























Patients prefer public to private treatment if vT
j (y ￿ p;b;wj) ￿ vT
j (y ￿
m;b;0). ^ hGP
j (y;p;m;wj) is the threshold below which patients prefer public










Patients prefer private treatment to no treatment if vT
j (y ￿ m;h;0) ￿
vNT
j (y). The health gain threshold above which patients prefer private treat-
ment to no treatment is ^ hPN









Patients with high bene￿t and low income demand public treatment.
Patients with high bene￿t and high income demand private treatment. Pa-
tients with low bene￿t demand no treatment.
come. Let y be income if treated, let income if not treated be y￿ L(y), and denote utility
if not treated as ^ v
NT(y ￿ L(y)). Then we can write v
NT(y) = ^ v
NT(y ￿ L(y)). It also
allows for a ￿xed user charge p for the treatment. Let utility if treated be ~ v
T(y ￿p;h;wj)
and write v
T(y;h;wj) = ~ v
T(y ￿ p;h;wj) without loss of generality since p does not vary
across groups or with income or with waiting time.
12The joint density and distribution functions over health gain and in-
come for group j are fj(h;y) and Fj(h;y). The expected demand for public










j (y;wj) = max[min[^ hGP
j ;hmax];^ hGN
j ].















j ;y)dy < 0
When waiting time increases some public sector patients decide not to be
treated (￿rst term) and some patients opt for the private sector (second
term).
Total welfare is the sum of the utility of public patients, private patients

































j (y;wj) = max[min[^ hGP
j ;hmax];^ hPN
j ] and ^ hN












j (y) ￿ vT











j (y ￿ p;^ hGP
j ;wj) ￿ vT























jw(y ￿ p;h;wj)fj(h;y)dhdy < 0 (31)
The ￿rst term is the e⁄ect on public sector patients who decide not
to be treated when the waiting time for the public sector increases. The
second term is the e⁄ect on public sector patients who decide to switch to
the private sector. But since the welfare function respects the choices of
patients both of these terms are zero. Thus the welfare e⁄ect of an increase
in waiting time is via its e⁄ect on the utility of patients treated in the public
sector.
Dividing (31) through by the number of treated patients (￿jDj) we can
write the marginal social cost of an increase in waiting time for group j in









jw(y ￿ p;h;wj)fj(h;y)dhdy=￿jDj (32)
The constraint on the welfare problem of allocating a ￿xed total supply of
public sector care between the two groups is the same as in Section 3 and so
Propositions 1 and 3 hold when there are user charges in the public sector,
a private sector alternative, utility is not separable, and treatment a⁄ects
income.
145 Conclusions
In many countries public sector health care treatments are rationed by wait-
ing. We have investigated whether di⁄erent groups of patients, de￿ned by
their preferences or distribution of bene￿ts from treatment, waiting for the
same treatment should be given di⁄erent waiting times. We have shown
that, even with a simple utilitarian social welfare function which respects
individual choices and places the same weight on the utility of members of
di⁄erent groups of patients waiting for a treatment, it is in general welfare
increasing to give di⁄erent waiting times to the di⁄erent groups of patients.
The rationale is that rationing by waiting imposes deadweight losses: the
cost of waiting imposed on patients is not o⁄set by gains elsewhere. It is not
necessarily the case that the groups with higher expected bene￿t from the
treatment should have shorter waits. Shorter waiting times should be of-
fered to groups with higher marginal waiting time costs and with less elastic
demand for the treatment.
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Appendix: concavity of welfare function






= SwAwA(wAz)2 ￿ SwAwBwAzwBz + SwAwAzz
+SwBwB(wBz)2 + SwBwAwBzwAz + SwBwBzz
Since the cross partials of S with respect to wA and wB are zero, the welfare
function is concave in zA only if Swjwj(w0
j)2 + Swjw00


















^ hj( ￿ w)
vT
jw(h;wj)dFj(h)
The ￿rst term in the square brackets is negative if vT
jww(h; ￿ w) < 0 but
the second term is positive. Since
Djww = ￿^ hjw(wj)fj(^ hj(wj)) ￿ ^ hj(wj)f0
j(^ hj (wj))
and
^ hjw(wj) = ￿vT
jw(^ hj;wj)=vT
jh(^ hj;wj) > 0
the sign of the term on the second line is also in general indeterminate
without further restrictions on the distribution function and preferences.
Note that in the case of the plausible seeming preferences used in Lindsay
and Feigenbaum (1986) where vT = he￿rw￿a, the utility function is convex
in waiting time: vT
ww = r2e￿rw > 0.
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